If you are a Jewish Iranian, living in the U.S. from the age of 6, it is very likely you don't like Ahmadinejad. So of course you would like to show how you hate him and how he is such a liar and how evil the entire government he represents is, in any way you can.
So you decide to attack one of the only positive angles Iran has been reported: Sex-change. And why not connect it to Ahmadinejad's speech in your city's university, Columbia, where he said in Iran homosexuality doesn't exist the same way it does in the U.S. (We all know the united Republican/Democrat anti-Iran front translated that to a denial of homosexuals in Iran.)
Tannaz Eshaghian's 'Be Like Others' (or 'Transsexual in Iran,' as BBC titled it) is a well-made documentary, but it is dishonest and unfair.(Watch it on iPlayer) It basically try to say being gay in Iran is so hard that forces gay men to go through the brutal process of sex-change. So even though the Islamic Republic look surprisingly cool with transsexuality on the surface, it is actually killing scores of gay men by separating them from their family, forcing them into a constant struggle of identity, inflicting physical and psychological pain on them -- and turning them into prostitutes, in the end.
But this is not exactly what every viewer would see in the film. They might ask, for instance, if being gay is so hard, how come Ali (Anoush's boyfriend) doesn't feel marginalized, isolated, or even under any kind of pressure?
Ali likes Anoush even before Anoush does the sex-change operation and while he still has male sexual organs. So if Iran is so cruel to homosexuals and hangs them, how come Ali is still not only walking, but working as a hairdresser and even is so comfortable with his name, face and identity be revealed by the film?
Ali's character, in my mind, is the most important one in the film and he is the one that undoes the main message of them film. He is a living evidence of how homosexuality exists in Iran and how and why it is tolerated, and Eshaghian fails to bring it into her core message of the film.
He shows how homosexuality, as a social phenomenon, doesn't exist in Iran because the lines between being straight and gay has historically been blurred in the Iranian culture. Sexuality has never been forced into strict categories in Iran and this could be quite related to what Judith Butler argues in her work.
But the film is also dishonest in details. The most important part, which is also central to the core of the message, is when she shamelessly mistranslates the young cleric who defends sex-change operations. He says transsexuality has nothing to do with homosexuality which is "immoral and irreligious". But guess how it is translated by Eshaghian to twist his logic: "something unnatural and against religion." Wow!
I don't want to get into the list of funders and producers of the film. But I can't resist the temptation of raising two questions. Especially given the continuous anti-Iran propaganda the BBC Two has produced and showed in the past few years.
a) Why Alexandra Kerry's name (Yes, John Kerry's daughter), as a co-producer is missing from the BBC credits?
b) Why the name of another co-producer, Ilan Ziv, an Israeli film-maker and producers with such films as Human Weapon (on the history of suicide bombing traced back to Iran), People Power (on 'non-violent revolutions around the world' with insight from Gene Sharp, 'a leading expert on non-violent struggles') is also removed from the BBC credits?
Just for your information, President of National Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman, was on VOA's Persian TV last week and he 'discussed NED's mission and the prospects for democracy in Iran.'
Here is the full-length video:
Here is my latest column fro The Guardian's Comment is Free website:
For sixteen years, Iranian government was in the hands of the Euro-American educated bureaucrats who were gradually departing from the specific subjectivity (rejection of the universals, in Foucault's term) which brought about the Iranian uprising of the 1979. The spectre of modernity slowly started to dominate everything, from the economy to the politics, and the two consequtive administrations picked up a similar project of modernisation which the shah had previously failed to continue, and with it, the gloomy consequences started to wane in too: corruption, incompetence, and socio-economic inequality.
I am really surprised how those, like Noam Chomsky, who are so strongly against any type of American intervention in other countries, can support Akbar Ganji's blatant -- and shameless -- call for intervention in Iran. Can someone just show Ganji's recent article in the Newsweek, titled 'The Fight For Iran's Freedom', to these people who put their valuable signatures under whatever nonsense that Ganji's colonized mind produces?
In this struggle, as in the general fight for democracy and human rights, Iranians need the support of the international community, including the American people. At this moment, the best thing Americans could do for us would be to prevent their own government from launching another war in the Middle East and to urge it to desist from threatening Iran with military strikes and regime change. Such rhetoric only strengthens the Iranian regime and makes our work more difficult.
Iran's pro-democracy movement is rooted in the country's moral, cultural and spiritual values. The fight for freedom is our own responsibility, not that of the Bush administration. Iranians need the American people to support us by lobbying their government to adopt policies that will help the forces of democracy and civil society. The Middle East desperately needs peace, not another war.
by Michel Foucault
Published in Corriere della Sera, November 26, 1978
Tehran – Iran's year-long period of unrest is coming to a head. On the watchface of politics, the hand has hardly moved. The semi-liberal September government was replaced in November by a half-military one. In fact, the whole country is engulfed by revolt: the cities, the countryside, the religious centres, the oil regions, the bazaars, the universities, the civil servants, and the intellectuals. The privileged rats are jumping ship. An entire century in Iran – one of economic development, foreign domination, modernization, and the dynasty, as well as its daily life and its moral system-- is being put into question.
I cannot write the history of the future, and I am also rather clumsy at forecasting the past. However, I would like to try to grasp what is happening right now, because these days nothing is finished, and the dice is still being rolled. It is perhaps this that is the work of a journalist, but it is true that I am nothing but a neophyte.
Iran was never colonized. In the nineteenth century, the British and the Russians divided it into zones of influence, according to a pre-colonial model. The came oil, the two World Wars,and the Middle East conflict,and the great confrontation in Asia. At one stroke, Iran moved to a pre-colonial position within the orbit of the United States. In a long period of dependency without direct colonization, the country's social structures were not radically destroyed. These social structures were not completely overturned, even by the surge of oil revenue, which certainly enriched the privileged, favoured speculation, and permitted an over-provisioning of the army. The changes did not create social forces, however. The bourgeois of the Bazaar was weakened, and the village communities were shaken by the agrarian reform. However, both of the survived enough to suffer from the dependency and the changes that it brought, but also enough to resist the regime that was responsible for these changes as well.
This same situation had the opposite effect on the political movements. In the half-light of dependency, they too subsisted, but could not sustain themselves as real forces. This was due not only to repression, but also to their own choices. The Communist Party was tied to the USSR, was compromised by the occupation of Azerbaijan under Stalin, and was amphibious in its support of the 'bourgeois nationalism' of Mossadeq. With respect to the National Front, Heir of this same Mossadeq, it has been waiting for fifteen years, without making a move, for the moments of a liberalization that it did not believe to be possible without the permission of the Americans. During this time, some impatient cadres from the Communist Party were becoming technocrats for the regime. They were dreaming of an authoritarian government that would develop a nationalist politics. In short, the political parties had become victims of the 'dependent dictatorship' that was the shah's regime. In the name of realism, some played the card of the independence, others that of freedom.
Because of, on the one hand, the absence of a colonizer-occupier and, on the other, the presence of a national army and a seizable police force, the political-military organizations, which elsewhere organized the struggle for decolonization and which, when the time came, found themselves in a position to negotiate independence and impose the departure of the colonial social phenomenon. This does not mean that the rejection is confused, emotional, or barely self-conscious. On the contrary, it spreads in an oddly effective manner, from the strikes to the demonstrations, from the bazaars to the universities, from the leaflets to the sermons, through shopkeepers, workers, clerics, teachers, and students. For the moment, however, no party, no man, and no political ideology can boast that it represents this movement. Nor can anyone claim to be at its head. This movement has no counterpart and no expression in the political order.
The paradox, however, is that it constitutes a perfectly unified collective will. It is surprising to see this immense country, with a population distributed around two large desert plateaus, a country able to afford the latest technical innovations alongside forms of life unchanged for the last thousand years, a country that yet languishing under censorship and the absence of public freedoms, and yet demonstrating an extraordinary unity in spite of all this. It is the same protest, it is the same will, that is expressed by the doctor from Tehran and a provincial mullah, by an oil worker, b a postal employee, and by a female student wearing the chador. This will includes something rather disconcerting. It is always based on the same thing, a sole and very precise thing, the departure of the shah. But for the Iranian people,this unique thing means everything. This political will years for the end of dependency, the disappearance of the police, the redistribution of oil revenue, an attack on corruption, the reactivation of Islam, another way of life and new relations with the West, with the Arab countries, with Asia, and so forth. Somewhat like the European students in the 1960s, the Iranians want it all, but this 'all' is not a 'liberation of desires.' This political will is one of breaking away from all that marks their country and their daily lives with the presence of global hegemonies. Iranians also view the political parties – liberal or socialist, with either a pro-American tendency or a Marxist inspiration – or, it is better to say, the pontifical scene itself, as still and always the agents of these hegemonies.
Hence, the role of this almost mythical figure, Khomeini. Today, no head of state, no political leader, even supported by the whole media of his country, can boast of being the object of such a personal and intense attachment. These ties are probably the result of three things. Khomeini is not there. For the last fifteen years, he has been living in exile and does not want to return until the shah has left. Khomeini says nothing, nothing other than no – to the shah, to the regime, to dependency. Finally, Khomeini is not a politician. There will not be a Khomeini party; there will not be a Khomeini government. Khomeini is the focal point of a collective will. What is the unwavering intransigence seeking? Is it the end of a form of dependency where, behind the Americans, an international consensus and a certain 'state of the world' can be recognized? Is it the end of a dependency of which the dictatorship is the direct instrument, but for which the political manoeuvres could well be the indirect means? It is not only a spontaneous uprising that lacks political organization, but also movement that wants to disengage itself from both external domination and internal politics.
After I left Iran, the question that I was constantly asked was, of course, 'Is this revolution?' (This is the price at which, in France, an entire sector of public opinion becomes interested in that which is 'not about us.') I did not answer, but I wanted to say that it is not a revolution, not in the literal sense of the term, not a way of standing up and straightening things out. It is the insurrection of men with bare hands who want to lift the fearful weight, the weight of the entire world order that bears down on each of us, but more specifically on them, these oil workers and peasants at the frontiers of empires. It is perhaps the first great insurrection against global systems, the form of revolt that is the most modern and the most insane.
One can understand the difficulties facing the politicians. They outline solutions, which are easier to find than people say. They range from a pure and simple military regime to a constitutional transformation that would lead from a regency to a republic. All of them are based on the elimination of the shah. What is it that the people want? Do they really want nothing more? Everybody is quite aware that they want something completely different. This is why the politicians hesitate to offer them simply that, which is why the situation is at an impasse. Indeed, what place can be given, within the calculations of politics, to such a movement, to a movement through which blows the breath of a religion that speaks less of the hereafter than of the transfiguartion of this world?
Ramin Jahanbegloo claims, in a recent interview on CBC's The Hour, he was never involved in anything political and he was only arrested because he was a Canadian as well as an Iranian citizen and that they told him he was a spy only because he carried a Canadian passport. What an honest and innocent man!
Jahanbegloo on CBC's The Hour
But seriously, if serving at a federally funded program, known as the Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program, at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is not political activity, then what is political activity?
If a sovereign country is not supposed to prosecute or at least be suspicious of someone who has served at the heart of its enemy's intelligence apparatus (Allen Weinstein, a founder of the NED' said once that a 'lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA,' then what is sovereignty?
If ramin jahenbegloo was never involved in politics, then how one could ever describe his writings for the NED's journal, journal of Democracy:
Jahanbegloo's ties with NED is so public now that it's unimaginable how a CBC producer have not possibly run into it. Why everyone is ignoring to mention this, while it was exactly what the iranian authorities publically anounced for Ramin Jahanegloo's arrest, and also Jahanbegloo himslef confirmed it in an interview in Tehran after his release?
Who do you think have the guts to raise this finally in Canada?
P.S: The CBC had used my photo of Jahanbgeloo on the screen in the back, without my knowledge and since the CBC is a commercial channel, it has violated the Creative Commons license, attributed to it. If we can't sue the CBC for their PR-style journalism toward Jahanbegloo, maybe we can sue them for using this picture. Anyone? :)
Given the incredible influence the pro-Israel politicians and consultants have on Hillary Clinton's campaign, I think she would be quite dangerous for Iran (and the rest of the Middle East), even though, I don't think, she would be much different from Obama as to internal Amercian politics.