I was a guest last week on the BBC World's Have your say programme, talking about Iran, Syria and Israel's nuclear programmes. Predictably, the other guests were all Pro-Israel Jewish Americans, but I think I didn't do that bad in challenging their usual self-fulfilling prophecy. Does anyone know if a transcript is available?
Here is the official BBC description of the show:
Does every country have the right to be nuclear? (Listen to the entire show - MP3 file)
25 April 2008
America has accused Syria or developing a reactor with North Korea's help. If it was there, it's not anymore as Israel bombed the site. Syria says the accusations are nonsense. But what of the principle here... Why shouldn't Syria or any other country develop nuclear facilities whether for weapons or energy? 45 african countries have expressed their desire for nuclear power... Would you oppose them getting it?
Duration: 51mins | File Size: 24MB
So the White House has officially celebrated Nowrooz, the Iranian new year, by setting up a Haft Sin table in the State Dining Room. Another example of public diplomacy? Maybe. Does it fool Iranians to understand how much the U.S. government cares for them? Mmm, I'm not sure.

A random comment I found the other day on an Iranian website would give the White House an idea about how their attempt is being read in Iran.
The commentator basically said when Khatami was appeasing the Americans and talked of dialogue with the U.S., Bush called Iran evil and put it in an axis along with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Now that Ahmadinejad is aggressively standing up against the Americans, the same Bush has started to finally show some respect for the Iranian culture and Nowrooz and have even set up a Haft Sin table -- and even explicitly acknowledges Iran's right for civil use of nuclear energy.
If Iran continues to be defiant and doesn't give up its rights, an average Iranian would argue, the next step would be for the U.S. to acknowledge the right of the Iranian state to exist and accept that the Islamic Republic is a government that a strong majority of Iranians (Not of the type Bush usually gets to meet or get advice from) have chosen and have given legitimacy.
Another term for Ahmadinejad will convince the Americans that the Islamic Republic is Iran is here to stay.
The New York Times published the following editorial in 1953, literally two days before the CIA coup against Mohammad Mossadegh. You just need to replace Mossadegh's name with Ahmadinejad and turn the context from nationalization of oil to nuclear programme in order to see how little has changed the way the Americans see those who resist:
Source: The New York Times, Editorial
August 15, 1953
The world has so many trouble spots these days that one is apt to pass over the odd one here and there to preserve a little peace of mind. It would be well, however, to keep an eye, on Iran, where matters are going from bad to worse, thanks to the machinations of Premier Mossadegh.
Some of us used to ascribe our inability to persuade Dr. Mossadegh of the validity of our ideas to the impossibility of making him understand or see things our way. We thought of him as a sincere, well-meaning, patriotic Iranian, who had a different point of view and made different deductions from the same set of facts. We now know that he is a power-hungry, personally ambitious, ruthless demagogue who is trampling upon the liberties of his own people. We have seen this onetime chamption of liberty maintain martial law, curb freedom of the press, radio, speech and assembly, resort to illegal arrests and torture, dismiss the Senate, destroy the power of the Shah, take over control of the army, and now he is about to destroy the Majlis, which is the lower house of Parliament.
His power would seem to be complete, but he has alientated the traditional ruling classes — the aristocrats, landlords, financiers and tribal leaders. These elements are anti-Communist. So is the Shah and so are the army leaders and the urban middle classes. There is a traditional, historic fear, suspicion and dislike of Russian and the Russians. The peasants, who make up the overwhelming mass of the population, are illiterate and nonpolitical. Finally, there is still no evidence that the Tudeh (Communist) party is strong enough or well enough organized, financed and led to take power.
All this simply means that there is no immediate danger of a Communist coup or Russian intervention. On the other hand, Dr. Mossadegh is encouraging the Tudeh and is following policies which will make the Communists more and more dangerous. He is a sorcerer’s apprentice, calling up forces he will not be able to control.
Iran is a weak, divided, poverty-stricken country which possesses an immense latent wealth in oil and a crucial strategic position. This is very different from neighboring Turkey, a strong, united, determined and advanced nation, which can afford to deal with the Russians because she has nothing to fear — and there the West has nothing to fear. Thanks largely to Dr. Mossadegh, there is much to fear in Iran.
In order to know more about Mehdi Khalaji and why the infamous Israeli-lobby's think-tank, WINEP, has hired him, here is a paragraph from his latest Policy paper, published online by WINEP:
For the president, the Hidden Imam sanctions his aggressive and defying policy toward the West. More worryingly, certain Shiite traditions state that the Imam’s return will come at a time of world chaos, and Ahmadinezhad seems at times to promote chaos for that end. Meanwhile, for the Supreme Leader, there is no theological or ideological restraint for producing weapons of mass destruction or waging offensive wars. While Iranian diplomats repeat that according to Islamic law it is prohibited to kill innocent civilians or produce nuclear weapons, the theological views of the Supreme Leader are not consistent with this claim.
Three months in the wonderful SOAS' MA programme as the Film and Media centre, I can say the most important thing I've learned so far is summarised in two readings:
Both are challenging the notion of the society as a systematic, coherent and total(ised) entity, as well as demystifying the concept of masses, as a de-historised, finalised, totallised, passive and easily controllable concept.
Basically, unlike what a lot of media theories constitute, media can't simply control the masses, even though the elite who runs the media tend to think so.
A great recent example to me is a new poll (I know that polls are not reliable for the same reason that there is no such thing as masses, accorind at least to Baudrillard) that shows two third of the Israelis are not yet bought into the idea of the necessity of attacking Iran; and all this despite such severe and ongoing propaganda against Iran in Israel by almost all the media outlets.
That doesn't mean activists should not resist the process of hegemonic articulation according to the interests of the rich and the powerful in any given society. But they (or maybe I should say we here) should all be aware that putting all our energy in countering these processes of articulation is as ineffective on the public opinion as the attempts by those who run the media.
I beg to say that the main premise on which Sadeq Saba's new analysis is built upon is just false.
In his piece about the harsh criticism against Ahmadinejad, published in a newspaper in iran called Jomhoori-e Eslami, he argues that support for Ahmadinejad is diminishing among within the senior leadership of Iran.
That's becoming an increasingly popular theme these days and the way I read it is that the U.S./UK official line against Iran is slightly shifting towards exploiting the remaining limited potentials of Rafsanjanists in breaking the political unity and common will behind the nuclear programme and particularly the decision not to give up on the enrichment.
The British/American alliance has now publicly started to give a louder voice to the Rafsanjanists inside Iran (from Shirin Ebadi to Hassan Rohani) and outside (almost all Democrat-leaning figures such as Abbas Milani and Akbar Ganji) in order to widen the potential differences of opinions among the key decision-making figures and institutions.
So it doesn't matter to Mr. Saba that painting Jomhouri-e Eslami as a newspaper that reflects Khamenei's positions is totally false. One only needs to go back and see during the previous elections and afterwards it has always been Rafsanjani who has enjoyed the full support of the newspaper, not Ahmadinejad.
In this context, it is very predictable to see such attacks from one of Rafsanjani's most faithful media allies. And it's not event the first time Jomhouri-e Eslami is diong this. (See an eariler report from January 2007 for example.)
What is happening in the past few months is that Khamenei is becoming more and more supportive of Ahmadinejad in private and public, at the same time that he keeps his distance with him. So Khamenei supports him more while he also criticised him more. (For instance, read the transcript of his speech for the government cabinet a few months ago.)
Mind you that I didn't vote for Ahmadinejad and I have my criticism of many of his actions and rhetoric. However, I can't close my eyes on such obviously inaccurate and politically-motivated journalism that has shamelessly become so common in the Euro-American media.
Apparently Washington post's Robin Wright has become their role model.
To be honest, with Bernard Kouchner's Cheney-style remarks, I suspect Sarkozy has paved the way for some sort of Israeli lobby to the French foreign policy machine, which I think is unprecedented.
This blog post, that I just found, gives more detail: Bernard Kouchner: Israel Got Lucky
Reports on an increased possibility of a US attack on Iran are raising some serious concerns. But I don't think it is anything but a psy-op, possibly this time by the liberals to frighten and provoke the Iranian government either to give up the enrichment or to do something stupid that could become a pretext for the more severe UN sanctions.
There is absolutely nothing Bush could gain from such attack and this is not something that only the liberals are saying. But even the most radical but realistic anti-Iranian policy makers in Israel, such as Avigdor Liberman, or in Washington, such as Patrick Clawson, acknowledge the fact that military attack is neither going to stop Iran from its nuclear programme, nor will it weaken or destabilise the government in any way.
And then it's also the Iranian response that could actually destabilise the markets everywhere leading to a serious energy crisis that could anger the EU, China and India and widen the split between the U.S. and the rest of the industrial world.
Knowing all this, Iran has carefully been censoring any news about an imminent attack to undo the psy-op and at the same time, all Iranian opposition, even Reza Pahlavi, have repeatedly said they were against military attack and now have no choice other showing some public contempt to save their integrity.
I suspect soon the U.S. would have no choice but to accept a nuclear Iran, the way Israel, according to senior strategist Ephraim Kam, is ready (PDF) to do so.
It is time to let the world know about Ephraim Kam's report which I am surprised why the Anglosaxon media has never paid enough attention to.
In case you haven't read it, here is the most important part of it:
Living with a Nuclear-Enabled Iran
The conclusion is threefold:
- The United States, Israel, and other countries must do their utmost to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear capability, since once Iran has nuclear weapons it will be much harder (and militarily impossible) to effect any rollback and disarm it.
- The military move must be included in steps to be considered, both as an option in itself and as a means of increasing pressure on Iran.
- At the same time, these countries will have to prepare for a scenario in which Iran obtains nuclear weapons, all the while maintaining efforts to block this very outcome.
In preparing for this scenario, Israel must:
- Strengthen its deterrent capability towards Iran. Israel currently has limited deterrence against Iran's recourse to conventional weapons and terrorism, based on its strategic capabilities and its relations with the United States. This capability may ebb if Iran obtains nuclear weapons. Therefore, Israel must use the years until Iran attains nuclear capability and take additional steps to bolster its deterrence against a nuclear attack, including: convincing Iran that a nuclear attack on Israel may fail because of Israel’s anti-missile system; strengthening its deterrent credibility against the Iranian regime, and convincing Iran that should Israel be attacked with nuclear weapons, it would retain a response capability that would exact a heavy price from Iran.
- Strengthen strategic cooperation with the United States against Iran. Israel's aim is that the US administration will make it clear to Iran that any Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or its other allies will be viewed as an attack on the US itself, which would force it to act without reservation and with its full strategic strength against Iran. Israel will have to reexamine the possibility of bolstering its deterrent capability by entering into a defense treaty with the United States and/or joining NATO at the appropriate time.
- Take steps, in collaboration with the United States and other countries, to limit risks – beyond the threat of a nuclear attack – resulting from Iran obtaining nuclear capability.
- Reexamine its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel would be best served by maintaining nuclear ambiguity, but it is possible that conditions will emerge that will force it to relinquish this policy, such as the conduct of the Iranian regime, its need to increase its deterrence and clarify its red lines, or potential channels of communication with Iran on the nuclear issue.
- Consider the possibility of agreeing to the idea of a nuclear weapons-free Middle East, as a means of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear arms or of disarming Iran.
- Examine the possibility of a peace agreement with the Syrian regime, at the right time and with conditions that are acceptable to Israel, in the hope that this leads to limiting Syria's close ties with Iran and an end to its military support of Hizbollah. If there is a possibility of a peace agreement with Syria, which would entail further warming of Israel’s relations with other Arab countries, the effect of Iran’s militant approach will also be reduced, and there may even be dialogue between Israel and Iran. But even if such dialogue does not develop, it will be hard to assume that under such regional conditions Iran would decide to launch a nuclear attack against Israel.
Can Israel live with a nuclear Iran? Possibly, but it is hard to anticipate this situation. Certain conditions – some of which are not yet extant – may help to soften this reality, and reduce the Iranian threat and the uncertainty that it contains.
These include:
- Collecting credible intelligence that Iran is not planning to use its nuclear weaponry against Israel.
- Obtaining a clear American obligation to retaliate against Iran with a nuclear strike should Iran use nuclear weapons against Israel.
- Arriving at an assessment in Israel that is based on clear, credible indicators that Israel's strategic capability effectively deters Iran from recourse to nuclear weapons.
- Seeing more moderate officials join the circle of decision-makers in Iran.
Finally, if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, this would obligate Israel to try to build up a stable deterrent capability against Iran, which will prevent unintentional deterioration to nuclear confrontation. As yet there are no accepted rules of behavior in a nuclear environment between Israel and Iran, there is no communication and no dialogue, and there is insufficient understanding of the set of considerations and the decision-making processes of the other side. Such uncertainty is liable to increase the risks of miscalculation, overreaction, escalation of crises, and difficulty stopping deterioration in time.
Israel thus has a critical need to try to build channels of direct communication with Iran. Even if indirect, these could allow fostering rules of the game and pursuing confidence building measures in a nuclear environment and help guard against nuclear deterioration. Assuming that Iran is also interested in preventing miscalculations by the US and Israel, which may lead to deterioration and heavy internal damage, the possibility of generating such channels of communication, possibly via European governments, is not unreasonable.
Who do you guess has said the following paragraph? Read it and I'll tell you later:
Iran today is very much like the Soviet Union in its last days. The ideology has burnt out, Iranian youngsters are disenchanted, the reform movement has failed to fulfil the popular demand and there has been practically every year spontaneous rioting and uncivil unrests in the major cities of Iran. But 25 years after the revolts that did away with the Shah and his regime, there is an absence of an organizational factor to unite the diverse inspirations of Iranians.
[..]
Based on this analysis of the Iranian situation, we are left with three scenarios for the future of Iran:
1) In the first scenario the Iranian regime will weather the storm and the so -called pragmatists or centrists among the ruling elite of Iran will be the survivors. Thanks to a leadership vacuum among the opposition, the centrists will buy some time by offering a series of strategic concessions. These concessions may come in two forms: to the West on the issue of WMDs and the Middle East peace plan, and to the Iranians in the area of social controls and guardianship (which could be replaced by the Expediency Council with a sudden death of Ayatollah Khamenei). Under this formula, Iran will integrate in the market economy and there will certainly be a shift from a monopolistic, mafia-type of economy represented by the new class of property owners to a more normalized market stability and investment security. The tendency of the pragmatist political leaders such as Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaii and centrist religious intellectuals such as Sadegh Ziba Kalam and Shamsolvaezin towards centrist politics is, in a sense, is a reflection of this change in Iran’s capitalist class. In this first scenario Rafsanjani will have an important role as the power broker.
2) In the second scenario unlike the first one the clerical regime will not be able to stand the socio-economic and political pressures and will be left with only one option to defend itself and that is a “palace coup” by the conservatives and the security agents such as Asgaroladi (leader of the Islamic Coalition Group), Badamchian and Shariatmadari (editor in chief of the journal Kayhan) to save the Revolution and the political Islam. Unclear though is the role played in this scenario by Ayatollah Khamenei?
3) In the third scenario the regime change will be inevitable. Irrespective of tactical manoeuvres by the Islamic regime and the absence of an organized leadership by the opposition, the regime will be unable to stave off the energy of dissent and answer the demands of the Iranian youth and Iran will see a series of urban unrests. In this scenario, there is also the closing of a window of opportunity for the Iranian regime and the imminence of political chaos in Iran.
It's sad to see how many exiled Iranian 'experts' have exchanged their objectivity and independent sense of truth with a pro-American bias. Although, when you live in the U.S. and want to work in a think-tank, even a democrat-leaning one, it would be very self-destructive to do otherwise.
I've been following Karim Sajadpour since he was an expert with International Crisis Group and have usually found his analysis from a rather objective and independent point of view.
But his recent column in the Washington Post's PostGlobal, titled 'The Costs of Iran’s Political Pageantry' suggests he has departed from his previous perspective and now very clearly sees the world from an American point of view rather than an objective, independent one.
I hope it has nothing to do with his new job as an analyst at the American Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The following is a comment under his column that I think has done a valid and brief critique of Sajadpour's piece:
Mr. Sadjadpour is making a commentary not from an objective, non biased point of view, but rather from a very Pro-American / Pro-British point of view, and therefore he negates the possible informative aspect of this article in to no more than "spin" and propaganda, which is no different than the behavior of some of the Iranian elements which he attempts to scrutinize and show criticism towards.
His article is also intentionally misleading towards the true dynamics of these current events in attempt to make something appear to be one thing when it is something else all together.
In one line Sadjadpour says: "After all, Iran publicly humiliated its long-time nemesis Britain", and though this statement is true, as technically speaking Britain came out of this with the short end of the stick and Iran has acquired some well deserved points for its proficiency in nonconventional diplomacy, the fact of the matter is that Sadjadpour attempts to mislead us all when he states "Tehran may feel like it has chastened the Europeans to think twice before working in concert with the U.S. . . "
The "Europeans"? Granted the U.K. is a member of the European Union, but Britain does not represent European interests in the Middle East, nor have the "Europeans" as a collective been affected in any significant way by the recent events between Iran and the U.K., events which has definitely affected Britain.
If Iran was trying to convey a message to anyone, it's message was to the United States, The United Kingdom and Israel and more importantly a message to it's Arab neighbors. Yet to say that this issue was between "Europe" and Iran in any direct or indirect manner, or that there is some sort of ongoing political tension between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Europe is purely BOVINE EXCREMENT as they might say.
It appears to be an ongoing pattern for the western world to both misrepresent the truths of what is occurring in the Middle East and at the same time to underestimate both Western and Local Middle Eastern capabilities to confront the issues and tensions which seem to perpetually stir in the region.
Both the United States and the U.K. have made very critical and significant mistakes and miscalculations when dealing with both the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, two nations which did not even come close to the capabilities of Iran currently possesses in way of Martial philosophy and stratagem. If the United States and the U.K. are finding it difficult to manage and contain Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran would only turn out to be the greatest and most long lasting mistake that the U.S. could ever make if it decided to initiate an open and actual conflict the the Islamic Republic.
Sadjadpour highly criticizes Iran for double standards, yet fails to own up to the double standards of both the United States and Great Britain.
There are no innocent players in this game. The United States and The U.K. are no less oppressive than Iran, and I would venture to say though that Iran might end up the more justified in the long run.
Iran may not emerge out of this as "The Winner" in the long run, but neither will it become the "loser" either. The only ones who will fail to succeed and suffer loss in this continuing SNAFU will be the United States and the United Kingdom, two nations which seem to never learn from their previous historical mistakes.
These are my recent articles published in The Guardian. You can leave
your comments at the end of each articles:
Stop bullying Iran
The Islamic Republic is worth defending. Even at its worst, it is way
better than anything the US or anyone else can bring to Iran.
Fight for your sites
Technology can beat internet censorship, but in some countries - such
as Iran - lawyers may be a better option.
The BBC has revealed plans by the US Center of Command in Florida to heavily attack the military infrastructure in Iran. This is pretty serious, especially if you know Frank Gardner:
BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner says the trigger for such an attack reportedly includes any confirmation that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon - which it denies.
Alternatively, our correspondent adds, a high-casualty attack on US forces in neighbouring Iraq could also trigger a bombing campaign if it were traced directly back to Tehran.
I've written before and I repeat it here. If the U.S. attacked Iran, despite all my problems with the Islamic Republic, I'd go back and fight these bastards.
The worst of Khamanei is hunderd times better than the best of Bush.
Watch me on Uvda, an Israeli TV show that did a short piece on my visit. And leave your comments here too. Oh, to buy an I love Tehran t-shirt, go to its official website.
To know more abuot my visit to Israel, please check out these articles:
The deadline set for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment by the UN Security Council has passed. But sanctions are not only unlikely, they're illogical.
Read the rest in my new blog at the Washington Post.
Two years ago I did not want Iran to produce nuclear energy for electricity, let alone for its military. Today I've changed my mind. Iran needs nuclear weapons to defend itself.
Read the rest in my blog at the Washington Post.